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THE POWER NOT TO TAX
KIRK J. STARK*
Among the most controversial changes in federal tax policy in recent years is
the new limitation on the deductibility of state and local taxes—or SALT cap.
Introduced as part of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, the SALT cap
differentially burdens residents of high-tax “blue states,” prompting some
lawmakers to characterize the cap as an act of “economic civil war.” In one of
the opening salvos of this “war,” a handful of blue states turned to alternative
devices for raising revenue through the use of tax credits for charitable donations
to state-designated funds. This strategy, modeled on long-standing “red state”
tax credits used to fund private school vouchers, is rooted in the government’s
“power not to tax,” understood here as the power to conditionally refrain from
imposing taxes in exchange for the taxpayer making some legislatively
sanctioned outlay. The introduction of the SALT cap has given new significance
to this power not to tax, encouraging state and local lawmakers to devise
strategies for funding public goods without utilizing formal tax mechanisms.
This Article explores and evaluates the structural features of the law that
account for this new state of affairs, as well as the ongoing controversy regarding
how best to address the basic discontinuity in the law’s treatment of formal
taxation versus conditional reductions in taxation. It also provides a blueprint
for an alternative federal tax framework based on the uniform treatment of
“social contributions”—i.e., a broader category of outlays including both taxes
paid to state and local governments as well as charitable gifts.

* Barrall Family Professor of Tax Law & Policy, UCLA School of Law. For helpful
comments on earlier drafts, the author would like to thank Ellen Aprill, Steve Bank,
Howard Chernick, Andy Grewal, Daniel Hemel, Jason Oh, Katie Pratt, Darien Shanske,
Larry Zelenak, Eric Zolt, and participants in workshops at Loyola Law School, UCLA
School of Law, and the National Tax Association.
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INTRODUCTION
Of the many controversial features of the Trump administration’s
signature tax legislation, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA),1
which took effect in 2018, perhaps the most contentious was the new
limitation on the deductibility of state and local taxes. Under that
provision, for tax years 2018 to 2025, individual taxpayers may deduct
only $10,000 in state and local taxes paid.2 Under previous law, in place
from the beginning of the modern income tax in 1913 through 2017,
deductions for state and local taxes were largely unlimited and thus
provided substantial federal assistance to the funding of state and local
public goods. As a result of the new limitation, taxpayers now face a
significant increase in the after-tax cost of funding education, health
care, environmental protection—and a wide range of other essential
services—particularly in “blue states” where voters have typically
demanded service levels requiring higher tax burdens.3

1. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA), Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11042, 131 Stat. 2054,
2085 (2017) (amending I.R.C. § 164(b), adding a new paragraph, (6)).
2. Id.
3. The six states bearing the greatest burden from the change include California,
Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Maryland, New Jersey, and New York. See Frank
Sammartino et al., The Effect of the TCJA Individual Income Tax Provisions Across Income Groups
and
Across
the
States,
TAX
POL’Y
CTR.,
Mar.
28,
2018,
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Not surprisingly, lawmakers representing these states have not
responded favorably to the new limits on the federal deductibility of
state and local taxes (SALT). Shortly after TCJA’s enactment New York
Governor Andrew Cuomo asserted that the SALT cap “pillage[s]”
states with higher tax burdens, fomenting an “economic civil war.”4
Once the SALT cap took effect, New York and several other states
began considering legislation aimed at restoring the ability of their
residents to fund state and local public services on a tax-favored basis.
States have considered a wide range of options, including shifting from
nondeductible income taxes to deductible payroll taxes and imposing
new entity-level taxes on pass-throughs, such as partnerships and LLCs.
But the most controversial response has been for states to provide tax
credits for charitable gifts to funds established by state and local
governments to support public goods. In the months following TCJA’s
enactment, numerous states considered such legislation and by mid2018 Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and Oregon had enacted
legislation authorizing such charitable tax credits.5
The Trump administration’s initial response to these efforts
alternated between dismissive and derisive. The President’s former
chief economic advisor, Gary Cohn, was the first to express skepticism
about state efforts to plan around the new SALT deduction limits,
responding to questions from a reporter on a cable news show.6 Shortly

https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/effect-tcja-individual-income-taxprovisions-across-income-groups-and-across-states [https://perma.cc/5FLE-6TG5].
4. Lauretta Brown, Cuomo Claims GOP Tax Bill ‘Pillages’ Blue States, Creates ‘Economic
Civil War’, TOWNHALL (Dec. 28, 2017, 2:10 PM), https://townhall.com/tipsheet/
laurettabrown/2017/12/28/ny-gov-cuomo-says-gop-tax-bill-pillages-blue-statesn2427826 [https://perma.cc/X7UR-PCD2].
5. 2018 N.Y. Sess. Laws 229, 265 (McKinney); 2018 N.J. Sen. 1893, 218th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2018). Similar legislation has been introduced in several
other states—including California, Colorado, the District of Columbia, Illinois,
Nebraska, Rhode Island, Virginia, and Washington, to name just a few. Brian Tumulty,
Eight States May Follow New York’s Workaround for SALT Deduction Limits, BOND BUYER
(Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.bondbuyer.com/news/eight-states-may-follow-new-yorksworkaround-for-salt-deduction-limits [https://perma.cc/GV8F-P2RA]. See, e.g., Cal.
Assemb. B. 2217, 2017 Assemb., Reg. Sess. (CA 2017) (seeking to allow taxpayers an
80% credit against income taxes owed for contributions to the Bridget “Biddy” Golden
State Credit Program).
6. Alexis Leondis, Gary Cohn Says Government May Push Back Against State Tax
Workarounds, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 5, 2018, 10:43 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2018-01-05/cohn-says-government-may-push-back-against-state-taxworkarounds-jc22ggqt [https://perma.cc/8B84-LFAK].
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thereafter Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin called the idea of treating
gifts to local governments as deductible charitable contributions
“ridiculous.”7 Like Governor Cuomo’s remarks about a pending
economic civil war, the initial reaction from Trump Administration
officials provided more heat than light. While commentary from the
political class tended toward the deliberatively provocative, officials
with expertise in the tax law issued more cautious statements, noting
initially that they were following state-level developments.8 In late
August 2018, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued proposed
regulations addressing this issue, and in June 2019, these regulations were
finalized, accompanied by a notice indicating that additional regulatory
guidance would be forthcoming.9 Meanwhile, the state of New York and
the town of Scarsdale have initiated litigation in federal court challenging
the validity of these regulations.10 On the legislative front, Democrats in
the U.S. Senate forced a vote of the full chamber on a resolution that sought
to overturn the new regulations pursuant to the Congressional Review
Act.11 Although the resolution did not pass, its consideration highlights the
ongoing political salience of state responses to the SALT cap.
The primary objective of this Article is to look beyond the blustery
rhetoric regarding these so-called “SALT workaround” strategies and
evaluate the structural features of the tax law at the heart of the
ongoing controversy regarding their legal viability. The primary allure
of state charitable tax credit programs, whether enacted before or after
the SALT cap, derived from a basic discontinuity in the federal tax
law’s treatment of two methods of funding state and local legislative
priorities: (1) imposing taxes and appropriating the resulting revenue (i.e.,
7. Jonathan Curry, Mnuchin Dismisses SALT Workarounds, Charitable Giving
Concerns, 158 TAX NOTES 310 (2018).
8. See Fred Stokeld, Treasury Monitoring State Proposals on Charitable Donations and State
Taxes, 158 TAX NOTES 607, 607 (2018) (noting statement from Treasury Tax Legislative
Counsel that the department would “monitor developments as they happen across states”).
9. Contributions in Exchange for State or Local Tax Credits, 83 Fed. Reg. 43563,
43571 (Aug. 27, 2018) (proposed rule); Contributions in Exchange for State or Local
Tax Credits, 84 Fed. Reg. 27513, 27530 (June 13, 2019) (finalized rule).
10. David McKay Wilson & Joseph Spector, Why NY, NJ, CT and Scarsdale Are Suing the
IRS over Tax-Deduction Limits, LOHUD (July 17, 2019, 12:42 PM), https://
www.lohud.com/story/news/politics/politics-on-the-hudson/2019/07/17/why-ny-nj-ctand-scarsdale-suing-irs-tax-deduction-limit/1754920001 [https://perma.cc/V3E6-XKJQ].
11. Naomi Jagoda, Senate Rejects Dem Measure to Overturn IRS Rules on SALT
Deduction Cap, HILL (Oct. 23, 2019), https://thehill.com/policy/finance/467158senate-rejects-dem-measure-to-overturn-irs-rules-on-salt-deduction-cap
[https://perma.cc/BE5B-R5N7].
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“tax and spend”) and (2) providing charitable tax subsidies via deductions,
credits, and other devices for transfers made directly by taxpayers to certain
legislatively specified organizations (i.e., “tax expenditures”).
Anyone with an elementary understanding of tax policy, particularly
as it has evolved in the United States over the past half century, will
appreciate the parallels between these two methods of financing public
goods. While formal government appropriations typically require
formal taxation as a source of funding, “tax expenditures” accomplish
the same result not through actual government outlays but rather by a
conditional reduction of tax liability. The distinction is chiefly one of
form, a point cleverly illustrated by the late public finance economist,
David Bradford. As Bradford explained, a government hoping to
acquire weapons for national defense need not purchase them from
manufacturers with tax revenues, but instead, could simply provide
manufacturers a “weapons supply tax credit” in exchange for the
weapons.12 The two approaches accomplish the same substantive result
(the acquisition of weapons) but the former entails the imposition of
a formal tax coupled with appropriations, while the latter actually
“reduces” the overall tax burden.
The controversy over SALT workarounds is, at its core, a debate
regarding the appropriate federal income tax treatment of state and
local tax expenditures for charitable outlays. That is, when a state or
local government decides to “fund” some legislative priority using the
charitable tax expenditure approach (providing tax credits in exchange
for donations) rather than the formal tax and spend approach (collecting
taxes and appropriating revenues), how should federal tax law treat a
taxpayer whose formal tax liability has been conditionally reduced?
Should she be treated as having made a charitable gift? Or should she
instead be treated as having made a de facto payment of tax?
If federal law allows a deduction for both taxes and charitable gifts,
then the taxpayer will likely be indifferent as to how the outlay is
treated—either way she is entitled to a federal income tax deduction.
For better or for worse, however, federal tax law has not always treated
charitable gifts and SALT payments the same. Since at least 1986, when
Congress eliminated the deduction for state and local taxes for
12. David Bradford, Reforming Budgetary Language, in PUBLIC FINANCE & PUBLIC POLICY
NEW CENTURY 93–116 (Sijbren Cnossen & Hans-Werner Sinn eds., 2003). See also
Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 148 (2011) (Kagan, J., dissenting)
(asserting that formal taxation and reduction of tax liability through credits are essentially
interchangeable because they both “accomplish[] the same government objective”).
IN THE
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purposes of the alternative minimum tax,13 federal law has disfavored
the “tax and spend” approach relative to the “tax expenditures”
approach for funding state and local expenditures. During this period,
many states enacted exceptionally generous charitable tax
expenditures, typically in the form of high percentage state tax credits
(including many 100% state tax credits) for donations to government
entities, government-created funds, and nonprofits.14 In every case,
these credits had the function and purpose of funding some
legislatively determined program or activity through the conditional
reduction of donors’ tax liabilities.
The extent to which these programs may have been motivated by the
federal tax preference just described is unclear.15 Nevertheless, the
availability of such generous state tax credits gave taxpayers the
opportunity to mitigate the adverse effects of not being able to deduct
state and local taxes for purposes of the alternative minimum tax
(AMT) by making federally deductible gifts that reduced their state
and local tax obligations.16 This same point can be framed as an

13. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 56, 100 Stat. 2085, 2322 (1985).
14. There are over 100 such programs in place in thirty-three states, including
several that feature 100% state income tax credits. See Joseph Bankman, et al., Federal Income
Tax Treatment of Charitable Contributions Entitling Donor to a State Tax Credit, 159 STATE TAX
NOTES App. A (2018) (providing examples of state-supported charities in each state).
15. In the case of private school voucher tax credits, an important rationale for
using tax credits rather than direct government spending appears to have been a
desire to circumvent constitutional limitations arising from the First Amendment’s
Establishment Clause. See Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org., 563 U.S. at 148.
16. Financial advisors have long highlighted the tax benefits of donating to these
organizations for AMT taxpayers. See, e.g., Jamey Parker, Charitable Giving Can Be a Win
Win!, TKW BLOG (Aug. 2013), https://tkw.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/
Charitable-Giving-Can-Be-a-Win-Win.pdf [https://perma.cc/W2HP-HHDS] (noting
that Oregon state tax credits have the effect of “shifting your federal itemized
deduction from state tax expense, which is not deductible in computing AMT to
charitable contributions”); David Slade, ‘Donation’ Can Make You a Profit, POST &
COURIER (July 12, 2014), https://www.postandcourier.com/business/donation-canmake-you-a-profit/article_412688ac-87ef-5077-af48-a37ce59fb932.html
[https://perma.cc/84WJ-E7AJ] (describing benefit to AMT taxpayers of making
deductible gifts to South Carolina’s Exceptional SC fund, which entitles donors to
100% state tax credit); Bryan Strike, Charitable Donation and State Tax Credit!, KAYS FINANCIAL
ADVISORY CORPORATION, PROFESSIONAL WEALTH MANAGEMENT SERVICES (Sept. 20, 2016),
https://www.scottkays.com/article/2016/09/20/charitable-donation-state-tax-credit
[https://perma.cc/XCW3-B3PY] (describing tax advantages for AMT taxpayers to make
deductible gifts to Georgia’s Student Scholarship Organizations, which entitle donors to
100% state tax credit).
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element of charitable tax planning. For donors considering alternative
charitable transfers, gifts reducing the donor’s state or local tax liability
became relatively more attractive for taxpayers subject to the AMT.17
This strategy, which benefited only AMT taxpayers from 1987 to 2017,
acquired significantly broader appeal after the introduction of the SALT
cap in 2018. By limiting the SALT deduction, not just for AMT taxpayers
but for everyone, TCJA substantially increased the number of taxpayers
for whom relative state and local tax savings has become an relevant factor
in making charitable gifts—whether those gifts are made to private
universities, public elementary schools, or any other type of donee
described in section 170(c) of the Internal Revenue Code.18
Much of the initial commentary about state charitable tax credit
proposals focused on whether they would “work” or “pass muster” with
the IRS or the courts.19 While interest in this question is
understandable, especially given the polarized political environment
and the ongoing litigation on this matter, this binary frame obscures
both the structural source of the problem and its continuous nature.
To be sure, state charitable tax credits set to 100% (as with many
existing private school voucher tax credits) are the most eye-catching
examples, since with these programs, the donor could potentially fully
17. See, e.g., Kathleen Pender, Huge Tax Break for Donating to California College
Students, S.F. CHRON. (Oct. 3, 2014, 5:41 PM), https://www.sfgate.com/business/
networth/article/Huge-tax-break-for-donating-to-California-college-5800035.php
[https://perma.cc/B295-9X3N] (demonstrating that a taxpayer not subject to the
AMT would pay $2,680 in taxes if he applied the credit, rather than the $1,200 owed
if the taxpayer was subject to the AMT); Sarah K. Johnson, Making a Profit from
Charitable Donations in South Carolina, 73 STATE TAX NOTES 527, 531 (2014) (explaining
that taxpayers in different tax brackets would be impacted disparately based on
whether they were subject to AMT, with those in the lower brackets benefiting more).
18. Various commentators highlighted this effect of the law before it was enacted.
See, e.g., Manoj Viswanathan, How SALT Deduction Repeal Promotes State Capture of Federal
Charitable Contributions, SURLY SUBGROUP, (Nov. 9, 2017), https://surlysubgroup.com/
2017/11/09/-how-salt-deduction-repeal-promotes-state-capture-of-federal-charitablecontributions [https://perma.cc/RQ6A-354J] (observing that “many more taxpayers
could take advantage of state-level initiatives that essentially reclassify state and local
tax payments as federal charitable contributions”).
19. See, e.g., Peter L. Faber, Charitable Funds and the Disallowance of Federal Income
Tax Deductions for State and Local Taxes, MCDERMOTT, WILL & EMERY (Mar. 28, 2018),
https://www.mwe.com/insights/charitable-funds-disallowance-federal-income
[https://perma.cc/66QD-PQSY] (observing that “any attempt to mitigate its effects must
pass muster under established principles of the common law of taxation”); Amandeep S.
Grewal, The Charitable Contribution Strategy: An Ineffective SALT Substitute, 38 VA. TAX REV. 203,
206 (2018) (examining whether the charitable contribution strategy works).
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replicate SALT deductibility by making a qualifying charitable gift. But
even a state tax credit of 15% or 20% (or, for that matter, a standard
state income tax deduction for charitable giving) enables a donor to
circumvent the SALT cap to the extent of the tax savings derived from
making the federally deductible gift. Put differently, any state or local tax
savings derived from making any federally deductible outlay represents a
de facto breach of the $10,000 cap on the SALT deduction.
The essential point is that any tax savings from making a charitable
gift (including the tax savings derived from the federal deduction
itself) constitutes a “workaround” in that the taxpayer is reducing her
nondeductible tax liability by making a deductible gift. And because
the scope of donees eligible to receive federally deductible charitable
contributions is so broad (including state governments themselves,
along with their political subdivisions), state and local governments
have considerable latitude to use tax expenditures to steer resources
toward their own legislative priorities while giving donor-taxpayers the
opportunity to claim a federal charitable contribution deduction.
Paradoxically, in a world where both state and local taxes and
charitable gifts are deductible, states lack this ability. This is because
any state or local charitable tax subsidy is offset by a reduced SALT
deduction. But by limiting the SALT deduction, Congress gave state
and local governments both the opportunity and the incentive to
exercise their power not to tax and to direct charitable dollars toward
state and local legislative priorities.
Of course, the federal government could change the law to reduce
or even eliminate the incentive state and local governments to make
use of their power not to tax. The recently finalized Treasury
regulations attempt to do just that.20 But as we shall see, this is no
simple task. Among other things, this approach requires developing a
jurisprudence of “constructive taxation” to identify the circumstances
under which relief from potential taxation (via deductions, credits,
and other such mechanisms) constitutes a de facto payment of tax.21
And even if such a regime could be easily implemented, it leaves us
with a federal tax system that, ironically and perversely, confers
substantial tax benefits on charitable contributions to nonprofits
(rendering these “gifts” less charitable) but withholds those benefits
20. See infra note 95.
21. See, e.g., Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 129, 148 (2011)
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[B]ecause appropriations and tax breaks can achieve
identical objectives, the government can easily substitute one for the other.”).
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for tax payments to the same entities (rendering them more
charitable). This paradox flows from the basic illogic of treating
substantively similar transfers differently, and it could be avoided by
subjecting charitable contributions and state and local taxes to
uniform treatment,—e.g., making both deductible, disallowing a
deduction for both, or subjecting both to a uniform floor/ceiling
limitation. Such an approach would accord with the economic reality
that both types of outlays represent a type of “social contribution”
warranting equivalent treatment.
The Article is divided into four parts. Part I begins by providing
background on the federal income tax treatment of charitable
contributions and state and local taxes, as well as some basic data about
how taxpayers in different states made use of these deductions in the
years leading up to the enactment of TCJA. Part II then discusses how
the government can use its “power not to tax” (i.e., the use of
deductions, credits, and other tax benefits) to direct private resources to
fund legislative priorities without relying on formal taxes, as well as how
federal law has traditionally treated charitable outlays that give rise to such
tax benefits. As Part II explains, by limiting the deductibility of state and
local taxes, TCJA intensified an existing incentive in federal law for state
and local governments to rely on tax expenditures in pursuing legislative
priorities over the more conventional approach of collecting formal taxes
to fund formal expenditures.
Part III then provides a description and analysis of the recently
finalized SALT workaround regulations. While these regulations are
meant to address the discontinuity described in Part II, and in many
ways take an admirably principled approach to the controversy, the
approach adopted is incomplete and thus will likely serve only as a halfmeasure. That incompleteness derives from an understandable
reluctance to spell out clearly the full implications of the logic
underlying the regulations. The regulations imply (but stop short of
actually stating) that the portion of the donor/taxpayer’s payment that
is disallowed as a charitable contribution deduction is, in substance, a
payment of tax and thus should be treated as a “constructive tax.” The
problem with a forthright recognition of this logic is that it would
require a more fundamental (and more disruptive) reckoning with the
fact that “constructive taxes” are embedded in virtually every
“charitable” outlay, as well as any other outlay that has the effect of
reducing one’s federal, state, or local tax obligations.
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Part IV discusses legislative options available to Congress to unify the
income tax treatment of state and local taxes and charitable
contributions under a new provision for “social contributions.” By
bringing both types of transfers within the same framework, such an
approach would confer equivalent treatment on what are, in substance,
equivalent transfers, thereby eliminating any residual incentive to
recharacterize outlays as falling under one category or the other.
Finally, Part V concludes with a brief commentary on the cognate
nature of “taxation” and “gifts,” highlighting the many parallels
between the two. A better understanding of the shared purpose and
common history of taxation and charitable giving should not only
prompt consideration of alternative statutory reforms such as those
described in Part IV but also influence public discourse regarding the
fundamental nature of transfers made in support of public goods,
regardless of the form those transfers take.
I. THE TAX TREATMENT OF TAXES AND CHARITABLE GIFTS
For nearly the entire history of the U.S. income tax, charitable
contributions and state and local taxes have been treated the same—
i.e., both have been deductible in calculating taxable income.22 This
has not always been the case. In the early years of the federal income
tax, from 1913 to 1917, state and local taxes were deductible (as they
had been under the Union income tax in operation during the Civil
War) but charitable contributions were not.23 That period came to an
end with the passage of the War Income Tax Revenue Act of 1917,24
whereby Congress first allowed a deduction for charitable contributions.25
The ostensible rationale for allowing a deduction for charitable gifts was
to ensure that the income tax, with its newly increased tax rates to finance
the war effort, would not discourage individuals from donating to
charities established to promote the federal government’s war effort.26
Thus, from the very outset, the federal subsidy for charitable gifts

22. I.R.C. §§ 164, 170 (2012).
23. Edward H. Rabin, Charitable Trusts and Charitable Deductions, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV.
912, 912 (1966).
24. Ch. 63, 40 Stat. 300, 330 (1917).
25. Vada Waters Lindsey, The Charitable Contribution Deduction: A Historical Review
and a Look to the Future, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1056, 1061 (2003).
26. 2 Evelyn Brody, Tax Deduction and Philanthropy, in PHILANTHROPY IN AMERICA,
464, 465 (Dwight F. Burlingame ed., 2004).
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seems to have had as a central purpose the promotion of financial
support for government spending objectives.
Over the ensuing seven decades, from 1917 to 1987, federal law
allowed deductions for both state and local taxes and charitable
contributions.27 The Tax Reform Act of 198628 altered this equivalent
treatment for a subset of taxpayers. More specifically, the 1986
legislation made state and local taxes nondeductible for purposes of
calculating the AMT29 but continued to allow a deduction for
charitable contributions. Thus, for the several million taxpayers
subject to the AMT each year, federal law newly disfavored state and
local taxes relative to charitable contributions. As will be discussed in
greater detail below, this disparate treatment of the two types of outlays
under the AMT gave taxpayers an incentive to consider the state tax
savings associated with charitable gifts—and thus also gave state and
local governments a corresponding incentive to devise tax
expenditures to steer charitable contributions to legislative priorities.
Over this period, states enacted a wide range of tax credits for
contributions to various donees, including government entities,
government established funds, and other nonprofit organizations.30
Finally, with the enactment of TCJA in December 2017, all taxpayers
now face a $10,000 limit on the deductibility of state and local taxes.31
Significantly, however, because TCJA provided no corresponding limit
on the deductibility of charitable contributions, the same incentive
AMT taxpayers have faced since 1987 (i.e., to favor charitable gifts with
substantial state tax savings) now extends to the roughly 19 million tax
units who continue to itemize their deductions under the new law.32
Why should any of this matter? If the outlays at issue were wholly
distinct—like, say, home mortgage interest and medical expenses—
then whether the tax law treats them the same or differently would be
of no moment. However, difficulties arise when the law confers
27. I.R.C. §§ 164(a), 170(a) (1982).
28. Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 56, 100 Stat. 2085, 2322 (1986).
29. Id.
30. See Pender, supra note 17 (demonstrating that states have used tax credits for
educational funds); see also, Gen. Assemb. 154, 2017 Ga. Laws 526, First Sess. (Ga. 2017)
(reflecting government focus on revitalizing rural vacant downtown areas through tax
credits).
31. The AMT disallowance rule for SALT remains in place but applies to a
substantially smaller number of taxpayers. William M. VanDenburgh et al., 2018 1040ES Offers Relevant Guidance, 96 TAXES THE TAX MAG. 21 (Oct. 2018).
32. Id. at 29.
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inconsistent treatment on items that are, in substance, quite similar.
With regard to the three main normative considerations in evaluating
tax policy—fairness, efficiency, and administrative simplicity—a strong
case can be made against sharply differential tax treatment of
substantively similar transfers or transactions.33
Do charitable contributions and state and local taxes exhibit such
similarities? To be sure, we typically think of these as very different
types of outlays. “Taxes” are mandatory payments made to governments,
while “charitable contributions” are voluntary transfers made to
nonprofits. Viewed through this frame, there appear to be important
distinctions both as to (1) the nature of the transferee (government
versus private nonprofit), and (2) the nature of the transfer
(mandatory versus voluntary). But these differences, while certainly
important, are not as sharply binary as might first seem to be the case.
Regarding the nature of the transferee, it bears noting that state and
local governments are, of course, nonprofit organizations whose
activities are, in large measure, charitable in nature. In seeming
recognition of the parallels between governments and nonprofits, the
statutory definition of the term “charitable contribution” expressly
includes contributions or gifts to or for the use of state and local
governments.34 Thus, federal law explicitly envisions allowing a
deduction for contributions to or for the use of state and local
governments. But even if the statute did not expressly include
contributions or gifts to state and local governments, the other major
category of qualifying donees under section 170(c) includes
organizations “organized and operated exclusively for religious,
charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes.”35 With the

33. David Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84
CORNELL L. REV. 1627, 1632 (1999) (“Taxing similar activities differently causes
behavioral distortions and unfairness. Moreover, the complex doctrines needed to
draw these distinctions make compliance costly. Reformers, therefore, argue that a
broad tax base, one that taxes all forms of income equally, is the fairest, most efficient,
and most easily administered tax base.”).
34. I.R.C. § 170(c)(1) (2012). This provision includes the qualifier that such
contributions or gifts must be “for exclusively public purposes.” See Ellen Aprill, Professor,
Loyola Law Sch. L.A., Federal Tax Treatment of States, Political Subdivisions and Their
Affiliates, Presentation for the National Tax Association, (Nov. 16, 2018).
35. Id. § 170(c)(2)(B); see also Lessening the Burdens of Government as a Basis for Tax
Exemption Under IRC Section 501(c)(3), INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, https://www.irs.gov
/government-entities/lessening-the-burdens-of-government-as-a-basis-for-tax-exemptionunder-irc-section-501c3 [https://perma.cc/M8H2-9KRM] (last reviewed June 5, 2019).

2019]

THE POWER NOT TO TAX

577

exception of the reference to religion, this category of purposes
essentially mirrors a broad swath of state and local government
activities, including particularly such quintessentially governmental
(and quintessentially charitable) activities, such as education, health
care, environmental protection, and poverty mitigation. Given their
overlapping functions, it should come as no surprise that state and
local governments and nonprofit organizations often work in
partnership in pursuing these activities.36
A review of funding sources for the two types of entities also reveals
considerable overlap. State and local governments rely chiefly on ownsource tax revenue, user fees, and intergovernmental grants for their
funding.37 Similarly, nonprofits rely on a mix of fees (including 25%
from government contracts), charitable contributions (tax
subsidized), and government grants (funded by taxation).38 These
similarities suggest that traditional nonprofits and governmental
entities are drawing on the same pool of resources to fund a broadly
similar array of social investments.
As to the notion that taxes are “mandatory” and charitable
contributions are “voluntary,” this too is certainly true in a formal
sense. At first blush, most people would likely agree that “taxes” and
“gifts” are very different things. After all, legal sanctions typically apply
to those who fail to pay their taxes, while gifts to charity are ordinarily
made at the discretion of the donor. Few would deny that those are
clear and important differences between the two types of outlays. On
the other hand, there is an important element of voluntary choice in
taxation, particularly in the state and local setting. Individuals
voluntarily opt into state and local fiscal arrangements by virtue of their
residential decisions and often do so, at least in part, because of
preferences regarding the degree of income redistribution

36. See, e.g., Sarah L. Pettijohn, Nonprofits and Governments: A Mutually Dependent
Relationship, URB. WIRE: NONPROFITS & PHILANTHROPY (June 10, 2013),
https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/nonprofits-and-governments-mutuallydependent-relationship [https://perma.cc/MY6V-CB7K] (“While nonprofits are
dependent upon the public sector for funding, the government is dependent on the
nonprofit sector to provide services to its constituents.”).
37. U.S. Census Bureau, Quarterly Summary of State & Local Tax Revenue for 2017:
Q3 1, 2 (2017).
38. BRICE S. MCKEEVER, URB. INST., THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN BRIEF 2015: PUBLIC
CHARITIES, GIVING, AND VOLUNTEERING 1, 5 fig. 2 (Oct. 2015).
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undertaken by those governments.39 It is also the case that state and
local governments typically undertake social/charitable spending at the
behest of their voters, including (very commonly) support from those
who stand to be net contributors to a system of local public goods
provision.40 A vote to increase one’s own taxes to fund some charitable
undertaking is not identical to a decision to make a charitable gift, but
neither is it something altogether distinct. In both cases, the individual
is willingly surrendering private resources for some broader public
good. Thus, while it is no doubt true that taxes are “mandatory” in a
formal legal sense, it is also true that they arise and persist out of a
collective charitable impulse to invest in public goods in much the
same way as do voluntary contributions to nonprofits.
As to the “voluntary” nature of charitable contributions, once again
this is undoubtedly true in the formal sense of there being no
enforceable legal obligation to make any particular contribution to any
particular nonprofit organization. Nevertheless, few would dispute
that lurking behind that formal truism is a more complicated picture
regarding the motives of those who make charitable gifts. Those who
suspect that there may be more to the story than pure altruistic
impulses would not be surprised to learn that there is a substantial
academic literature investigating this precise question.41 While caution
is always warranted in making broad generalizations about diverse
human behavior, it seems to be unmistakably true that individuals
make charitable gifts for a wide range of complicated reasons—
sometimes out of desire to help those in need, perhaps because of
social pressure, or at times to signal wealth or secure influence.42
Beyond these general points about the many parallels between
taxation and charitable giving, one might further note that these two
39. Mark V. Pauly, Income Redistribution as a Local Public Good, 2 J. PUB. ECON. 35–36
(1973); Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 419 (1956).
40. See, e.g., Los Angeles, California, Homelessness Reduction and Prevention Housing,
and
Facilities Bond Issue, Measure HHH, BALLOTPEDIA
(Nov. 2016),
https://ballotpedia.org/Los_Angeles,_California,_Homelessness_Reduction_and_Preven
tion_Housing,_and_Facilities_Bond_Issue,_Measure_HHH_(November_2016)
[https://perma.cc/JP8Q-RWNU] (ballot measure increasing property taxes to “provide
safe, clean affordable housing for the homeless . . .” approved by 77.14% of voters).
41. For a summary of some of the academic work on this question, see Lise
Vesterlund, Why Do People Give?, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 568
(Walter W. Powell & Richard Steinberg eds., 2006).
42. Id. at 571–72; Laurie E. Paarlberg et al., The Politics of Donations: Are Red Counties
More Donative Than Blue Counties? 48 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 283, 284 (2018).
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forms of outlays have often been used interchangeably in funding
public goods. Over the span of human history, societies have relied on
both forms (sometimes without even regarding them as “different”
forms) as methods for pooling resources for social investments and
other collective undertakings.43 Through the centuries, distinctions
between “private” and “public” were often non-existent,44 rendering
futile any attempt to label transfers funding collective activities as
“taxes” or “gifts.” Of course, none of this is to suggest that taxes and
gifts are identical in every respect or that there are no meaningful
differences between the two. Rather, the point here is to emphasize
that these two types of outlays represent complementary and
43. As an example, consider the funding of Athenian warships via the liturgical
system and the antidosis procedure, described by Rob Reich in his recent book, JUST
GIVING: WHY PHILANTHROPY IS FAILING DEMOCRACY AND HOW IT CAN DO BETTER 31–33
(2018). As Reich explains, the funding would sometimes be provided voluntarily by
wealthy individuals, but in the absence of volunteers might also be assigned to a
specific wealthy individual, who would then either provide the funding himself or resist
the obligation by identifying a replacement donor that he believed to be wealthier and
thus better positioned to afford the required contribution. If the replacement donor
refused the transfer, the initial appointee would then have the right to offer to
exchange estates with the replacement donor. The replacement donor could either
accept this offer or, if he refused it, the matter would be referred to a court and jury
for resolution. Since this funding system involved, as Reich notes, “elements of
voluntarism and compulsion,” it provides a useful illustration of the sometimes hazy
line between taxation and charitable giving. Id. at 32.
44. In Colonial America, for instance, the line between “private” and “public”
charitable activities was often blurred owing to the close relationship between church
and state during this period. As Hall notes in his treatment of the history of American
philanthropy: “Because colonial legal codes did not clearly distinguish between
public/private and proprietary/nonproprietary domains, corporations and
associations (when they existed at all) served public rather than private purposes
[including] maintaining public order and providing education, poor relief, and (in
most colonies) religious services.” See Peter Dobkin Hall, A Historical Overview of
Philanthropy, Voluntary Associations, and Nonprofit Organizations in the United States, 16002000, 32, 33–34, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK (2d ed. 2006); see
also Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I:
Establishment of Religion, 44 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2170–76 (2003) (discussing
the role of state churches in discharging civil functions such as poor relief and
education, funded via religious taxes). The religious taxes that funded these activities
were common in most colonies and continued in some areas well into the 19th
century. See Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment: The Church-State Settlement in
the Early American Republic, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1385, 1458 (2004). Even after religious
taxes had been abolished, the Anglican church continued imposing taxes on the
general public for a period of years in order to fund its statutory obligation to provide
poor relief. See McConnell, supra, at 2170–71.
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interconnected sources of funding for broadly similar categories of
human activities. Thus, we should resist attempts to regard them as
fundamentally distinct or as somehow conceptually segregated into
separate silos intended for different purposes.
Most intriguingly—and perhaps relevant for understanding the
changes introduced by TCJA—different communities rely on a
different mix of “taxes” and “charitable contributions,” and those
differences have an unmistakable political valence. The Republican
Party has traditionally emphasized the value of lower taxes and smaller
government, putting greater emphasis on voluntary efforts to fund
public goods and address societal ills.45 The Democratic Party, by
contrast, has tended to place greater faith in public institutions funded
through taxation.46 It bears noting that these are, of course, broad
generalizations and that there are exceptions in history, across
communities, and among specific individuals that do not fit these
general descriptions. Nevertheless, this portrayal of a partisan divide
on the question of how best to fund public goods—through public
taxation or through private giving—captures something close to an
essential truth about contemporary American politics. In its strongest
form, the claim might be phrased as follows: as between two alternative
forms of funding public goods, Republicans (generally) favor
charitable contributions and Democrats (generally) favor taxation.
Evidence for these generalizations can be observed in state-by-state
tax return data on charitable giving and state and local taxes. As a
general rule, federal tax returns in “blue states” (understood here as
those that supported Hillary Clinton in the 2016 presidential election)
featured higher state and local tax deductions than those in “red
states” (those that supported Trump in 2016).47 Conversely, the states
with the highest average charitable contribution deductions were more
likely to be “red states,” while those with lower average deductions were
“blue states.”48 For 2016, the last year before the enactment of TCJA in
December 2017, the five states with the highest level of state and local

45. C. Boyden Grey & Elise Passamanni, Opinion, Here’s the Point of ‘Points of Light’,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/heres-the-point-of-points-oflight-1538433396 [https://perma.cc/EDE8-TNW3] (emphasizing Republican values
of reliance on volunteerism and charitable giving as an alternative to government).
46. See Paarlberg et al., supra note 42, at 285.
47. IRS, IRS TAX STATISTICS, INDIVIDUAL INCOME AND TAX DATA, BY STATE AND SIZE
OF ADJUSTED GROSS INCOME Hist. Tbl. 2 (2016).
48. Id.
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tax deductions were solidly Democratic, while those with the lowest
level were predominantly Republican.49
Table 1: State/Local Taxes Deducted per Itemizer (2016)
Bold = Supported Clinton in 2016; Italics = Supported Trump in 2016

Top Five States

Bottom Five States

1. New York ($21,721)

47. North Dakota ($6,179)

2. Connecticut ($19,519)

48. Nevada ($6,121)

3. California ($18,727)

49. Alabama ($6,062)

4. New Jersey ($18,044)

50. Tennessee ($5,654)

5. District of Columbia ($16,513)

51. Alaska ($4,925)

Source: IRS Statistics of Income
Data for all fifty states are shown in Figure 1 where states with higher
itemized SALT deductions are generally Democratic.50

49. Id.
50. Id.
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Figure 1: Average State & Local Tax Deduction per Itemizer by State for Tax
Year 2016
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By contrast, states with higher levels of charitable contributions per
itemizer tend to be Republican and those with lower levels of these
deductions are more likely to be Democratic.51 As shown in the table
below, the five states with highest levels of charitable contributions per
itemizer are solidly Republican, while states with lower levels tend to
be Democratic.52
Charitable Contributions Deducted per Itemizer (2016)
Bold = Supported Clinton in 2016; Italics = Supported Trump in 2016

Top Five States

Bottom Five States

1. Wyoming ($9,046)

47. Wisconsin ($3,499)

2. Arkansas ($8,863)

48. Vermont ($3,335)

3. Utah ($8,785)

49. Hawaii ($3,261)

4. South Dakota ($7,829)

50. Rhode Island ($2,773)

5. Tennessee ($7,195)

51. Maine ($2,746)

Source: IRS Statistics of Income
As with state and local taxes, there are of course exceptions (see
Figure 2 on the next page for all fifty states), but again, the tax return
data support the generalizations referenced above.

51. Id.
52. Id.
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Figure 2: Average Charitable Contribution Deduction per Itemizer by State for
Tax Year 2016

2019]

THE POWER NOT TO TAX

585

Patterns for charitable giving and taxation seen in the state-level data
shown above are also evident in local data. In a recently published
study looking at IRS county-level tax return data for the years 2012 and
2013, Paarlberg shows the predicted effect of a county’s percentage of
Republican voters on state and local taxes and charitable contributions
claimed by itemizing taxpayers.53 Their regressions show that federal
itemizers in counties with a higher level of Republican voters will claim
higher charitable contributions but a lower level of state and local
taxes.54 Conversely, itemizers in counties with more Democratic voters
claim higher deductions for state and local taxes but lower charitable
contributions.55 When these figures are combined to arrive at a “total
redistribution” figure, the data show that itemizers in counties with a
higher percentage of Republican voters engage in less overall
redistribution. As Paarlberg puts it, “[w]hen taking into account the
differences in other determinants across Republican-dominant
counties and non-Republican-dominant counties (local means), we
find total redistribution declines as percent of Republican voters
increases.”56 Simply put, Republicans tend to give more to charity than
Democrats, but their overall contributions are lower if gifts and taxes
are considered together.
Finally, the Paarlberg findings regarding “total redistribution” can
be seen in state-level data as well. Combining charitable contributions
and state and local taxes for all itemizers in all states, we can see that
the total level of “social contributions” is not as bifurcated into distinct
red and blue patterns as is the case when each type of outlay is
considered separately.57 Nevertheless, as shown in Figure 3 on page
587, it is generally the case that “blue states” engage in the most “total
redistribution.”58 Note, for example, that while New York and
Mississippi have roughly comparable levels of charitable giving per
itemizer ($5848 and $6034, respectively), the average social
contribution for New York itemizers ($27,569) is more than double the
level for Mississippi ($12,415). None of this is meant to cast aspersions
on different households’ giving practices. Rather, the central points
53. See Paarlberg et al., supra note 42, at 283–84.
54. Id. at 302, Tbl. 7.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 301.
57. IRS, IRS TAX STATISTICS, INDIVIDUAL INCOME AND TAX DATA, BY STATE AND SIZE
OF ADJUSTED GROSS INCOME Hist. Tbl. 2 (2016).
58. Id.
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are that (1) taxation and charitable giving are, in many ways,
substitutes, and (2) the composition of overall giving between the two
forms varies from state to state, with “blue states” generally favoring
more extensive redistribution undertaken more through taxation and
less through charitable transfers and “red states” generally favoring less
extensive redistribution undertaken less through taxation and more
through charitable transfers.
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Figure 3: Average Deduction for “Social Contributions” per Itemizer by State
for Tax Year 2016
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These data provide some political context for the statutory changes
introduced via TCJA. That legislation had many different components,
some of which, when considered independently, likely would have
secured strong bipartisan support, including changes such as the
reduction in the corporate tax rate, raising the standard deduction,
and doubling the child tax credit. In terms of revenue-increasing
provisions, however, the legislation left many with the impression, not
wholly unsubstantiated, that Congress intended to “penalize” blue
states by capping the SALT deduction at $10,000 while leaving
charitable contributions untouched.59 Indeed, in the wake of TJCA’s
enactment a group of states challenged the constitutionality of the
SALT limiting (via New York v. Mnuchin) including references in the
complaint to numerous statements from the Treasury Secretary and
others regarding the partisan motivation behind the change.60 While
it seems very unlikely that the political animus behind this provision,
however explicit, would lead a court to declare the SALT cap
unconstitutional, the New York v. Mnuchin litigation has brought to
light the degree to which Republican lawmakers sought to undermine
the “blue state” model of subnational redistribution (higher taxes,
lower charitable gifts, higher overall redistribution) in favor of the “red
state” model (lower taxes, higher charitable gifts, lower overall
redistribution). What Congress seemed not to anticipate, however,
despite explicit warnings, was that blue states would make use of a wellworn red state strategy of directing taxpayer resources to state and local
legislative priorities through the use of their power not to tax.
II. THE POWER NOT TO TAX
In the analysis above, I have emphasized that taxation and charitable
giving ought not be regarded as sharply distinct types of outlays, but
rather simply two different forms of accomplishing the same result.
Both represent transfers made by individuals in support of publicbenefiting activities and social investments. Both arise from some
unknown (and likely unknowable) mix of self-regarding and otherregarding motivations. And of course, the ultimate result of both, at
59. See supra notes 3–5 and accompanying text.
60. Compl. ¶ 1, New York v. Mnuchin, No. 18 Civ. 6427 (S.D.N.Y., filed Nov. 2,
2018). For further discussion of the states’ litigation strategy, see Yancy Roy, New York,
Other States, to Sue IRS over SALT Cap, NEWSDAY (July 17, 2019, 7:32 PM),
https://www.newsday.com/news/nation/cuomo-trump-irs-1.33934624
[https://perma.cc/B6EH-HU5C].
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least when done right, is the education of children, the promotion of
public health, and the alleviation of human misery in various forms.
Of course, reasonable people can disagree on the extent to which
taxation and charitable contributions actually achieve these results, as
well as the degree of overlap between them. But whatever distinction
there may be between “gifts” and “taxes” falls away completely to the
extent that a donor is using a gift to satisfy or reduce her tax liability.
There is very little daylight, perhaps even total darkness, between the
payment of a “tax” and the reduction of tax brought about by making a
legislatively specified “gift.” While this is most clearly true when the
beneficiary of the gift is a government-specified donee undertaking
government-specified activities and the amount of the tax savings derived
from making the gift exactly equals the amount of the gift (i.e., a 100%
tax credit), it is equally true in the case of any tax-subsidized gift, to any
donee, to the extent of the tax savings derived from making the gift.61
To illustrate, consider the example offered in the introduction,
where $X is transferred from Individual Y to fund some charitable
undertaking titled Program Z. This result can be accomplished by
“taxation” (whereby Y transfers $X to the government to fund Program
Z) or via a “tax-subsidized gift” (whereby the government provides Y
with a 100% tax credit for transferring $X to Program Z). In describing
these two approaches, one might reasonably wonder what value there
is in using two different words. Both accomplish the exact same
result—i.e., a transfer of $X by Individual Y to Program Z. Neither is
more or less “voluntary” or “mandatory” than the other, and each
approach has as much of a claim to being “charitable” as the other.
But for purposes of determining the tax consequences of the
transfer, we must nevertheless answer the legal question of whether the
tax-subsidized gift should be treated as a “tax” or a “charitable
contribution.” More precisely, should the outlay be regarded as a
payment of tax to the extent that it entitles the donor to a reduction
in her tax liability? This is not a new question, but its significance has

61. For example, assume that the government provides a 20% tax credit for
transfers up to $10,000 to one’s children. What word most accurately captures the
essence of this transfer? Is it a gift? Is it a tax? Is it some combination of the two? Or
perhaps something else entirely? Assuming A transfers $10,000 to her son and thereby
reduces her tax liability by $2000, it is certainly plausible to describe A as having made
a gift of $8000 and paid a tax of $2000. The plausibility of this characterization is not
diminished by the fact that A’s son is not himself a “government.” As we will see, this
is the approach taken by the Treasury regulations.
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come into sharper focus as a result of TCJA’s new SALT cap. In
addition, as we will see, the recently finalized Treasury regulations
adopt a view that is at odds with the approach taken prior to the
introduction of the SALT cap.62
As a matter of longstanding judicial and administrative interpretations
of the rules regarding deductible charitable contributions, the tax
benefits of giving (including the tax savings derived from federal income
tax deduction itself, as well as a state or local charitable contribution
deductions or credits) have traditionally been disregarded in determining
the amount of the taxpayer’s federal charitable contribution deduction.63
The effect of this rule has been to treat tax-subsidized gifts as “charitable
contributions” under section 170 rather than as “taxes” under section 164
or section 275, despite the fact that the contributions have the effect of
reducing the donor’s tax liability. I will discuss the legal underpinnings of
this “Full Deduction Rule” in further detail below.
The practical effect of this rule is differential tax treatment for the
two forms of funding public goods mentioned above: (1) the
imposition of conventional taxes, followed by legislative
appropriations of public expenditures, and (2) the conditional
reduction of tax liability (typically through the provision of an income
tax credit) for charitable or public-benefiting outlays made by a
taxpayer. Tax policy analysts have long recognized that these two
approaches to funding public goods are, in many important respects,
fundamentally indistinguishable.64 In the case of Method 1, the
government collects revenue and then appropriates those revenues for
legislative priorities. Thus, in the most literal and formal sense, the
resources are both transferred from the taxpayer to the government
(via tax payments) and then later transferred from the government
(via government spending) to those persons or entities carrying out
the expenditure functions. Method 2 accomplishes this same result
through an alternative form. Under this approach, a baseline level of
tax liability is specified by the government, but taxpayers can reduce
their tax liability by making outlays that satisfy certain legislative
62. See infra Section III.A.
63. See BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE TAX LAW OF CHARITABLE GIVING 80–81 (5th ed. 2014).
64. See STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX
EXPENDITURES vii (1973) (claiming that the author introduced “tax expenditures” into
modern parlance in a 1967 speech, when he used it to refer to “special exemptions,
exclusions, deductions, and other tax benefits” that the government could use to
provide financial assistance outside the traditional tax structure).
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priorities. In effect, the government spending is carried out by the
taxpayer herself (via her qualifying outlay), while her tax payment is
satisfied (via a tax deduction, credit, or other device) to the extent of
some portion of that outlay.
Note that under Method 1 (i.e., “tax and spend”) the government is
exercising its “power to tax” while Method 2 (i.e., “tax expenditures”)
involves the “power not to tax” or the conditional reduction of a tax
obligation that would be owed had the taxpayer not made the
qualifying outlay. Against this conceptual backdrop, we can see the
clear effect of TCJA (or any change in federal law limiting the SALT
deduction, including the 1986 amendment to the AMT) on state and
local government choices regarding how to fund public goods.
Method 1 is disfavored because any payment of taxes above $10,000 is
treated the same as nondeductible personal consumption, while
Method 2 is favored because of the ability of state and local
governments to fund public goods through tax subsidies targeted at
transfers that qualify as federally deductible charitable contributions.
While most state and local government activities are, not
surprisingly, implemented through formal taxation and expenditures,
it is nevertheless very common to rely on charitable tax expenditures
as a means of implementing subnational legislative priorities. In the
weeks preceding the enactment of TCJA, as it became clearer that the
final legislation would feature a significant new limitation on the
deductibility of state and local taxes, I asked the research librarians at the
UCLA School of Law to compile a list of existing state charitable tax
credits. This research revealed that, at the time of TCJA’s enactment,
there were roughly 115 charitable income tax credits in effect in thirtythree states for gifts made to various organizations, including
governments, government-established funds, and nonprofits.65 These tax
credits are designed to direct taxpayer resources to a diverse range of
government-specified charitable activities, including natural resource

65. See BANKMAN, supra note 14.
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preservation,66 private school tuition scholarship programs,67 financial
aid for college-bound children from low-income households,68 public
and private rural hospitals,69 shelters for victims of domestic violence,70
and numerous other state-supported programs.
By granting a tax credit to donors supporting these programs, the
government has chosen to forgo tax revenues that it would otherwise
receive in exchange for a donor transferring resources to some statedesignated program. The “correct” description of such a program is not
self-evident. By forgoing revenue, is the government simply stepping
aside—i.e., merely conferring a “lesser tax detriment” by not imposing a
tax on the transferor? Or is it instead imposing a de facto tax by allowing
the taxpayer to treat her gift as partial satisfaction of a tax that she would
have otherwise owed? Both descriptions have a plausible claim to the truth.
As explained below, how the law answers this question has important
consequences for the federal income tax treatment of the outlay.
A. Mechanics of State Charitable Tax Credit Programs
The federal tax mechanics of state charitable tax expenditures can
be illustrated by reference to one of the many programs that predate
the enactment of TCJA—i.e., the “Exceptional South Carolina Fund,”
a 501(c)(3) entity established by the South Carolina legislature to
receive donations to fund private school tuition scholarships for
children with special needs.71 Assume that taxpayer Jessamine expects
to owe $90,000 in South Carolina state income taxes. From 1987
onward, none of this amount would be deductible for Jessamine if she
66. See Jeffrey O. Sundberg, State Income Tax Credits for Conservation Easements: Do
Additional Credits Create Additional Value? 26 tbl. 1 (Lincoln Inst. Land Pol’y, Working
Paper No. WP11JS1, 2011), https://www.lincolninst.edu/sites/default/files pubfiles
/1961_1282_sundberg_finalwp11js1.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XFX-Z5DX] (listing state
tax credits as of 2011).
67. See CARL DAVIS, INST. ON TAX. & ECON. POL’Y, STATE TAX SUBSIDIES FOR PRIVATE
K-12 EDUCATION (2016), https://itep.org/wp-content/uploads/k12taxsubsidies.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UMP2-BV98].
68. Cal. Assemb. B. 2217, 2017 Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017).
69. H.B. 258, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2017).
70. MO. REV. STAT. § 135.550(2) (2019) (Missouri Domestic Violence Shelter Tax
Credit).
71. The formal name of the Exceptional SC Fund is the South Carolina
Educational Credits for Exceptional Needs Children Fund. The Fund is governed by
five directors, two of whom are appointed by the Chairman of the South Carolina
House Ways and Means Committee, two by the Chairman of the South Carolina Senate
Finance Committee, and one by the Governor.
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were subject to the federal AMT. And of course, following the
enactment of TCJA, with its new limits on the deductibility of state and
local taxes under section 164, only $10,000 of Jessamine’s expected
state tax liability is deductible, even if she is not subject to the AMT.72
As noted above, however, there are no comparable limits on the
deductibility of charitable contributions under section 170.73
Like most states, the state of South Carolina made it possible for its
taxpayers to exploit this difference in federal law by providing a 100%
state income tax credit for certain charitable gifts.74 This is a practical,
real-world illustration of the types of transfers described above. Rather
than raising revenue through taxation and appropriating funds for this
purpose, South Carolina exercised its power not to tax those who make
charitable donations in accordance with the state’s legislative
priorities. Thus, under South Carolina law, Jessamine could donate
$50,000 to the Exceptional SC Fund, which would entitle her to a
nonrefundable tax credit in the same amount when filing her state
income tax return. Assuming, for the moment, that the full amount of the
donation is respected as a deductible gift (an important assumption,
discussed further below), Jessamine’s federal return would include a
$10,000 deduction for SALT paid and a $50,000 charitable contribution
deduction. In sum, rather than facing the possibility of incurring $80,000
in nondeductible state income taxes, Jessamine hopes to preserve $50,000
of that amount, albeit as a charitable contribution rather than a payment
of taxes, by making the $50,000 “gift” to the state’s 501(c)(3) fund. On its
website for the Exceptional SC fund, the South Carolina Department of
Revenue advised donors that not only could they “claim a dollar for dollar
credit on state income tax liability” but also that they could deduct
contributions made to Exceptional SC on their federal income taxes but
must “add back the amount of the deduction for South Carolina income
tax purposes.”75 Accountants and financial advisors in South Carolina and
other states aggressively advertised the federal income tax benefits of
programs, such as the Exceptional SC school voucher program.76

72. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, § 11042(a)(2) (to be codified at I.R.C. § 164(b)(6)(B)).
73. I.R.C. § 170(b) (2012).
74. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-6-3585(A) (2019).
75. Exceptional SC, SOUTH CAROLINA DEP’T OF REVENUE (Nov. 11, 2018),
https://dor.sc.gov/exceptional-sc [https://perma.cc/KRH7-UGYW].
76. Carl Davis, The Other SALT Cap Workaround: Accountants Steer Clients Toward
Private K-12 Voucher Tax Credits, INST. ON TAX’N & ECON. POL’Y (June 27, 2018),
https://itep.org/the-other-salt-cap-workaround [https://perma.cc/PXQ6-P3QK].
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The post-TCJA charitable tax credits enacted in Connecticut, New
Jersey, New York, and Oregon are all structured around these same
basic legal principles, though there are some differences as compared
to pre-TCJA credits, such as the one in place in South Carolina. First,
the tax credits enacted in each of those states are less generous than
the 100% credit used in South Carolina and various other states that
have adopted school voucher tax credit programs. In New York, for
example, the state provides an 85% credit for donation to either of the
two state-established funds to provide resources for public education
and health care.77 Thus, one might regard the existing school voucher
programs as more aggressive than the more recent post-TCJA state tax
credits, at least insofar as the magnitude of the state tax benefit is an
element of that determination. Second, in South Carolina the entity
qualified to receive creditable donations is a 501(c)(3) organization
established and governed by the state legislature, whereas in New York
(for example) the charitable funds are “state-operated.”78
Some commentators have argued that state-operated funds (like
those in New York) are “completely different” from situations where a
non-governmental fund is merely authorized by the state to receive
donations to carry out state-specified functions (like the many pre-TCJA
programs that fund private school vouchers).79 The implication of this
argument is that gifts to a state-operated fund should not be deductible
(because of the credit) while gifts to a state-specified fund should be
deductible (despite the credit). As noted above, however, Congress has
determined that gifts to both state and local governments and nongovernmental nonprofit organizations are deductible as charitable
contributions.80 By putting both types of contributions on an equal
footing, the plain language of the statute appears to require that they
77. N.Y. TAX LAW § 606 (McKinney 2019).
78. N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 92-gg (McKinney 2019).
79. Jared Walczak, State Strategies to Preserve SALT Deductions for High-Income
Taxpayers: Will They Work?, 569 TAX FOUND. 5–6 (2018), https://files.taxfoundation.org
/20180105094213/Tax-Foundation-FF569.pdf [https://perma.cc/HZ5Y-K3EB] (“A
key distinction is that these contributions are not made to the state but to private
charities. They do reduce state tax liability, often quite significantly, but they do so by
leaving the state treasury worse off rather than making it whole. The contributions in
lieu of taxes proposal is completely different.”); see also Lawrence Zelenak, SALT Ceiling
Workarounds and Tax Shelters, STATE TAX NOTES, July 23, 2018, at 365, 375 (suggesting
that “it is necessary to determine whether a donee is sufficiently identified with the
state to trigger the inapplicability of the [Full Deduction Rule]”).
80. I.R.C. § 170(c)(1), (c)(2)(B)–(C) (2012).
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be treated the same. That is, contributions to both would either be
nondeductible (because of the credit) or deductible (despite the credit).81
In any event, if it were ever determined that such a formal distinction
was somehow relevant despite Congress’s clear statement to the
contrary, a state could always follow the South Carolina example and
establish a separate 501(c)(3) organization to carry out legislatively
specified activities. Alternatively, any state or local government could
enter into partnership arrangements with select nonprofits to conduct
activities consistent with lawmakers’ expenditure priorities. The
critical point is that section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code, which
allows a deduction for charitable contributions, expressly authorizes a
deduction for donations directly to state governments and their
political subdivisions, and even if it did not include this provision, the
various activities encompassed by section 170(c)(2) (e.g., education,
health care, poverty relief) essentially mirror the core expenditure
functions of state and local governments.82
B. The Full Deduction Rule
Of course, the central legal question for Jessamine, as well as donors
to any of the more recent funds established in other states, is whether
she is in fact entitled to claim a $50,000 charitable contribution
deduction for her donation to the Exceptional SC Fund even though

81. This conclusion is also supported by long-standing IRS guidance, which was
cited approvingly by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. American Bar Endowment,
477 U.S. 106, 117 (1986). See Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104; see, e.g., Ottawa Silica
Co. v. United States, 699 F.2d 1124, 1131–32 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (per curiam); Singer Co.
v. United States, 449 F.2d 413, 422–23 (Ct. Cl. 1971) (“[P]laintiff would have us decide
the case by distinguishing between a direct or indirect benefit derived. In other words,
plaintiff would say that if the transferor received, or expected to receive, benefits from
a transfer to a charitable transferee, which benefits were to be received only indirectly,
then regardless of the magnitude of those benefits, the transfer would still qualify as a
charitable contribution deduction under section 170. However, if those same benefits
were received, or expected to be received, directly from the transferee, plaintiff would
concede that, given a substantial quid pro quo, the transfer would not come within the
definition of a ‘gift’ or ‘contribution’ for purposes of deductibility under section 170.
Obviously, we cannot agree with plaintiff’s distinction.”).
82. § 170(c)(2); Frank Sammartino, How New York State Responded to the SALT
Deduction Limit, TAX POL’Y CTR.: TAXVOX BLOG (May 14, 2018),
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/how-new-york-state-responded-saltdeduction-limit [https://perma.cc/9GGJ-6RGF] (“The irony, of course, is that state
and local taxes support spending that is at least as much in the public interest as the
activities of private charities supported by charitable contributions.”).
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the outlay entitled her to a $50,000 state tax credit. It is tempting to
look at Jessamine’s situation and conclude that her $50,000 donation
to the Exceptional SC Fund is not a “true” gift deserving of a charitable
contribution deduction. For example, one might argue that Jessamine
lacks the requisite donative intent to make a charitable gift or that the
amount of her deduction should be reduced by the value of the
benefits/privileges she accrues (in the form of the tax credit) as a
result of making the gift. These are longstanding and familiar
principles in the tax law of charitable giving. For better or for worse,
however, the tax law has never treated the receipt of federal, state, or
local tax benefits that arise from making a gift as evidence that the
donor lacked the required donative intent or that some lesser amount
should be deducted.83 This is true despite the fact that the tax benefits
of giving have often been quite substantial, especially at particular
moments in U.S. history.84
This principle of federal tax law—which in separate work with
several co-authors I have referred to as the Full Deduction Rule—
deserves emphasis here because of its central role in the tax law of
charitable giving.85 Donors derive many tax benefits from making gifts.
All of these tax benefits have the effect of reducing the net cost of the
gift to the donor, sometimes quite substantially. And yet, taxpayers
have never been required to reduce the amount of their charitable
contribution deductions by the value of these tax benefits, even where
the benefits took the form of a reduction in the taxpayer’s
nondeductible tax liability. In other words, the amount of a donor’s
charitable contribution deduction is determined by reference to the
gross amount donated (or the fair market value of property donated),

83. See Joseph Bankman et al., State Responses to Federal Tax Reform: Charitable Tax
Credits, TAX NOTES, Apr. 30, 2018, at 641, 644 (noting that despite a donor benefitting
tax-wise by making the donation, current law reinforces this approach known as the
“full deduction rule”).
84. In 1960, for example, the top combined federal and state marginal tax rate for
a California resident was 97.5%, consisting of a 91% federal rate and a 6.5% state
income tax rate. For a taxpayer subject to these rates, making a $10,000 deductible gift
was virtually indistinguishable from making a $10,000 payment of taxes since a
deductible gift would have the effect of reducing the donor’s combined federal and
state tax liability by $9158.50—i.e., $8508.50 in federal savings ($9100, adjusted to
reflect the reduced SALT deduction from the state tax savings derived from making
the gift) and $650 in state tax savings.
85. See Joseph Bankman et al., Caveat IRS: Problems with Abandoning the Full
Deduction Rule, STATE TAX NOTES, May 7, 2018, at 547, 547.
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reduced by the value of non-tax benefits expected to be received as a
result of making the gift (i.e., quid pro quo rule) but not reduced by
the federal, state, or local tax savings arising from making the gift (i.e.,
Full Deduction Rule).86
Consider the many ways that donors use charitable gifts as a means
of reducing (satisfying?) their tax obligations. First, and most
obviously, there is a federal income tax deduction for charitable
contributions.87 This provision reduces the net cost of the gift to the
donor by the amount of the gift, multiplied by the donor’s federal
marginal tax rate.88 For a donor subject to the top federal marginal rate
of 37%, a $10,000 gift provides $3700 in federal tax savings. Federal
law has always allowed a deduction for the full $10,000 donated,
despite the fact that the deduction results in a $3700 reduction of the
donor’s otherwise nondeductible federal income taxes.89 Thus, in
effect, the donor here might be described as engaging in a
“workaround” strategy that enables her to bypass the law’s express
nondeductibility of federal income taxes.
Preventing this particular workaround strategy would entail
requiring taxpayers to calculate a deductible amount reflecting the fact
that the federal income tax is nondeductible. Because the tax benefit
takes the form of a deduction, its value is a function of the taxpayer’s
marginal tax rate. Thus, a taxpayer subject to a 37% marginal tax rate
who donates $10,000 would be allowed to deduct only $7299 (i.e.,
$10,000, multiplied by 1/1.37). Allowing a $7299 deduction for a
$10,000 donation would ensure that the federal income tax satisfied by
claiming the deduction (i.e., $2701, or $7299 multiplied by .37) will
not itself be deducted as part of the charitable contribution. Of course,
federal law has never required taxpayers to do this, despite the explicit
denial of a deduction for federal income taxes, but the implication of
those who argue against the Full Deduction Rule is that all taxpayers
should be required to compute their charitable contribution
deductions in this manner.90

86. Id.
87. Id. § 170(a)(1). In addition to the benefit of the deduction itself, those who
donate appreciated property may also be able to avoid having to recognize gain from
the transfer of the property. Id. § 170(e)(1)(A).
88. Id. § 170(b).
89. Id. § 275(a)(1).
90. Some have suggested that requiring donors to reduce the amount of their
charitable contribution deductions by the value of the federal deduction itself would
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Second, the donor may also be entitled to a state income tax
deduction for the gift. In California, for example, this could mean
additional income tax savings equal to the amount of gift, multiplied
by 13.3%—or another $1330 on top of the $3700 in federal tax
savings.91 In combination, the federal and state income tax deductions,
at least for donors in California, could potentially cut the net cost of
the gift to the donor in half. That is, despite making an outlay of
$10,000, the net cost of that transfer is only $4970. Again, using an
algebraic formula, it is possible to calculate an alternative deductible
amount that backs out the combined effect of the federal and state tax
savings. However, now this formula must account for the interaction of
federal and state law, particularly whether the value of the state
deduction is a function of the federal deduction (as would be the case,
for example, where state taxable income is determined by reference to
federal taxable income).92
Beyond the federal and state tax savings derived from charitable
contribution deductions, many states also provide income (or other)
tax credits to encourage charitable giving.93 These credits also reduce
the net cost of the gift to the donor and thus, in the absence of the Full
Deduction Rule, would be backed out of the amount of the charitable
be contrary to the purpose of having a charitable contribution deduction in the first
place. See, e.g., David Kamin, Treasury’s SALT Regulations: Fixing What They Can, MEDIUM
(Sept. 4, 2018), https://medium.com/whatever-source-derived/treasurys-saltregulations-9a7e121531ce [https://perma.cc/NK9D-H2UG] (“Sure, there’s a tax
benefit from the federal government, but that’s the very idea — the federal
government, for better or worse, wants to encourage this kind of giving and so is
subsidizing it.”). As shown in the text, however, the result of taking account of the
value of the deduction is not to deny a charitable contribution deduction altogether
(which would of course defeat the purpose of having such a deduction) but rather
simply to reduce the amount of the deduction to take account of the value of the
federal tax savings. Thus, rather than frustrating congressional intent, performing this
adjustment would serve the dual function of advancing the purposes of both
§ 170(a)(1) (allowing a charitable contribution deduction) and § 275(a)(1)
(disallowing a deduction for federal income taxes). As we will see, this is the apparent
goal of the recently finalized IRS regulations with regard to state and local tax credits—
i.e., to advance the purposes of both § 170 and § 164(b)(6). If the notion is to
simultaneously implement both provisions, this same logic would seem to apply to the
value of the federal deduction as well.
91. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 17041(a)(1) (West 2011); California Personal Income
Tax Laws, FINDLAW (2019), https://statelaws.findlaw.com/california-law/californiapersonal-income-tax-laws.html [https://perma.cc/T2QM-NZB2].
92. See Bankman et al., supra note 85, at 551.
93. See, e.g., 22 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 40-41-50 (2019).
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contribution that a donor is allowed to deduct. This would mean that
Jessamine would not be entitled to any charitable contribution
deduction for her contribution to the Exceptional SC Fund. Where the
value of the tax credit is less than 100%, the amount of the charitable
contribution deduction would be reduced by the value of the credit. Thus,
a donor making a $10,000 contribution that entitles her to a state
charitable tax credit of 40% would have to reduce her deduction by $4000.
As explained in further detail below, this is essentially the approach that the
IRS has taken in the regulations finalized in June 2019.94
While the operation of the Full Deduction Rule only became the
subject of debate in the course of the post-TCJA controversy over the
SALT cap, its role in the tax law of charitable giving is nevertheless
quite familiar. Anyone who has ever claimed a charitable contribution
deduction on Schedule A of Form 1040 has applied this rule, whether
they knew it or not, in filing their return. In some cases, the application
of the Full Deduction Rule had no effect on the donor’s federal
income tax liability. For example, where a gift reduces a state or local
tax obligation that would have been deductible, then the allowance of
a charitable contribution deduction for the full amount of the gift,
undiminished by the tax savings, simply shifts the deduction from 164
to 170 and thus a different line on Schedule A. In other cases, however,
the Full Deduction Rule has had the effect of allowing the taxpayer to
claim a charitable contribution deduction for outlays that reduce her
nondeductible tax obligations. This is true, for example, with regard to
any federal tax savings (nondeductible by virtue of section 275(a)(1)) as
well as any state or local tax savings for AMT taxpayers (nondeductible
from 1986 onward by virtue of section 56(b)(1)(A)(ii)).
By further limiting the deductibility of state and local taxes, not just
for AMT taxpayers for all itemizers, the 2017 legislation broadened the
population of taxpayers for whom the Full Deduction Rule provides a
federal tax advantage. It appears that Congress did not consider these
effects in its consideration of TCJA. Once the new law took effect,
however, it became apparent that the SALT cap’s interaction with the Full
Deduction Rule could potentially result in several hundred billion dollars
of lost revenue that Congress had hoped the SALT cap would raise.
Preserving the expected revenue increase would require a rejection of the
Full Deduction Rule through administrative regulations.

94. Infra Section III.A.
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III. TREASURY REGULATIONS AND CONSTRUCTIVE TAXES
We have now reached the crux of the current controversy, but the
analysis above has revealed various complications. Some of these
complications are conceptual, others legal and practical. Before
addressing those complications, however, it is useful to briefly describe
the approach that the Treasury Department has recently taken
regarding the continued role of the Full Deduction Rule.
A. Treasury Regulations Regarding State Charitable Tax Credits
On August 27, 2018, the Treasury Department issued proposed
regulations under section 170 concerning “Contributions in Exchange
for State or Local Tax Credits.”95 These regulations were issued in final
form—with only minor modifications—in June 2019.96 The
supplementary information included in the regulations provides an
extremely useful summary of the background and basic issues involved.
The regulations themselves are quite brief. Most significantly, the
regulations specify that “if a taxpayer makes a payment or transfers
property to or for the use of an entity described in section 170(c), the
amount of the taxpayer’s charitable contribution deduction under
section 170(a) is reduced by the amount of any state or local tax credit
that the taxpayer receives or expects to receive in consideration for the
taxpayer’s payment or transfer.”97 In effect, the approach adopted here
is to treat the value of any state or local tax credit as a “return benefit”
or “quid pro quo.” Thus, in the same way that a donor who gives $100
to NPR, receiving a $30 tote bag in return, may only deduct $70, so too
must a taxpayer who makes any gift generating a state or local tax credit
reduce the amount of her charitable contribution deduction by the
value of the credit.
The logic underlying this approach is not hard to understand. In
effect, the donation to NPR is bifurcated into two components: (1) a
$70 deductible gift and (2) a $30 nondeductible purchase of a tote bag.
Similarly, if a taxpayer makes a $100 gift that entitles her to a $30 state
tax credit, one can imagine treating the taxpayer as having made (1) a
$70 deductible gift and (2) a $30 nondeductible state tax payment. The

95. Contributions in Exchange for State or Local Tax Credits, 83 Fed. Reg. 43,563
(proposed Aug. 27, 2018) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1).
96. Contributions in Exchange for State or Local Tax Credits, 84 Fed. Reg. 27,513
(June 13, 2019) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1).
97. 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-1(h)(3) (2019).
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regulations very plainly provide for the first component of this
bifurcated treatment (i.e., the reduced deduction), but they stop short
of explicitly endorsing the second component. I will say more about
that dimension of the analysis below.
The regulations provide two important exceptions to the general
rule just described—as well as one additional “exception” that arises by
virtue of the scope of the general rule. First, the regulations specify
that a “taxpayer is not required to reduce its charitable contribution
deduction under section 170(a) on account of [any] state or local tax
deductions.”98 In other words, the regulations apply only to credits, not
to deductions. This exception seems to be a concession to
administrative simplicity. Requiring taxpayers to reduce the amount of
their federal charitable contribution deductions by the value of state
tax deductions would entail considerable complexity. To determine
the amount by which the federal deduction would need to be reduced,
taxpayers would have to know their state marginal tax rate, which itself
is likely to be a function of the availability and amount of the
deduction. It seems likely that the IRS wanted to spare taxpayers the
burden of making these circuitous calculations. But, of course, not
extending the regulations to deductions leaves open a “miniworkaround” opportunity. In effect, the taxpayer is satisfying a portion
of her state tax liability by claiming the state tax deduction. By allowing
her nevertheless to claim an undiminished federal charitable
contribution deduction despite those state tax savings, the regulations
are green lighting a de facto deduction for state taxes to the extent of
the state tax savings. It is possible that the IRS regarded the effects of
this lingering workaround as de minimis.
The second exception is related to the first. In addition to ignoring
deductions, the regulations provide a safe harbor for state tax credits
of 15% or less by noting that the general rule “shall not apply to any
payment or transfer of property if the total amount of the state and
local tax credits received or expected to be received by the taxpayer is
15 percent or less of the taxpayer’s payment, or 15 percent or less of
the fair market value of the property transferred by the taxpayer.”99
This safe harbor for credits of 15% or less appears to represent a
recognition that credits and deductions have the same effect and that
state and local governments should not have to adhere to the form of

98. Id. § 1.170A-1(h)(3)(ii) (emphasis added).
99. Id. § 1.170A-1(h)(3)(vi).
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a deduction to fit within the de minimis rule. The official summary of
the regulations notes that the 15% figure was chosen to reflect the
current maximum state and local income tax rate.100 Thus, the
implication would seem to be that taxpayers claiming a federal
charitable contribution deduction may ignore either the value of any
state tax deduction or the value of a credit of 15% or less, but not both.
How this rule will be operationalized in practice is not obvious in every
case. For example, if a local government provides a 15% credit against
local property tax liability for gifts to some local charity, donors might
take the view that the credit exception allows them to claim a full
charitable contribution deduction for the gift since the credit satisfies
the 15% threshold. If state law also allows an income tax deduction for
the gift, must the taxpayer reduce her federal charitable contribution
by the value of the state tax savings derived from making the gift?101
The regulations do not directly address this scenario.
Beyond these two explicit exceptions, there is a third exception that
is not mentioned in the regulations but applies by implication—i.e., an
exception for the tax savings derived from the federal charitable
contribution deduction itself. There is a conceptual puzzle at the heart
of the disparate approach taken by the regulations for state and local
tax credits (where the Full Deduction Rule is abandoned) and the
federal tax deduction (where the Full Deduction Rule continues to
apply). A more in-depth consideration of this puzzle may shed some
light on the choices we are making by adopting these rules.
Consider once again the basic rationale for requiring a donor to
reduce the amount of her $10,000 charitable contribution deduction
by the $4000 state tax credit—i.e., allowing a $10,000 deduction would
enable her to avoid the nondeductibility of $4000 of her state tax
liability. Because the law now treats the satisfaction of taxpayer’s state
tax liability as a form of nondeductible personal consumption, the
regulations apply the same treatment for state tax credits received in
exchange for a gift as would apply in the case of a tote bag received in
exchange for a gift. The reduction in the amount allowed as a
charitable contribution is necessary, so the argument goes, because not
100. See Contributions in Exchange for State or Local Tax Credits, 83 Fed. Reg. at
43,565 (“The 15-percent exception is intended to reflect the combined benefit of state
and local tax deductions, that is, the combined top marginal state and local tax rates, which
the Treasury Department and the IRS understand currently do not exceed 15 percent.”).
101. The example in the text involves the simultaneous application of the
exceptions found in paragraphs (ii) and (vi) of § 1.170A-1(h)(3).
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doing so would allow the taxpayer to smuggle some nondeductible
expense into her charitable contribution deduction.
But of course, this very same rationale applies to any federal, state,
or local tax liability that is reduced by virtue of making a charitable gift,
including the federal income tax deduction itself. To understand this
point, it important to keep in mind that just as state and local taxes in
excess of $10,000 are nondeductible by virtue of section 164(b)(6), all
federal income taxes are nondeductible by virtue of section 275(a)(1).
Thus, if the object of applying the quid pro quo logic to state tax credits is
to prevent taxpayers from smuggling nondeductible tax payments into
their deductible charitable contributions, then it would seem that the same
rule should apply to all nondeductible taxes, whether state, local, or federal.
The IRS may be reluctant to open this particular can of worms, given
the many administrative complexities associated with requiring donors to
treat the value of the federal deduction itself as a benefit requiring a
reduction in the amount of the taxpayer’s deduction. As a conceptual
matter, however, it is hard to escape the conclusion that the treatment of
state and local tax benefits in calculating one’s charitable contribution
deduction is tied to the fate of the federal tax benefits. The same logic
that supports treating a reduction in the taxpayer’s state and local tax
liability as a return benefit (i.e., to that extent, she is not making a gift but
deriving a personal benefit in the form of state/local tax savings) applies
with equal force in the case of any reduction in the taxpayer’s
nondeductible federal tax liability (i.e., to that extent, she is not
making a gift but deriving a personal benefit in the form of federal tax
savings). Put differently, one might note that, to the extent of any tax
savings derived from making a charitable gift, the donor is not acting
“charitably” but rather merely satisfying an obligatory tax. If that is the
logic behind the regulations, then it follows that the donor’s charitable
contribution deduction should be reduced by the value of all tax
savings, not just those arising from state tax credits.102
Thus, at bottom, the regulations do not represent a repudiation of
the Full Deduction Rule but rather a narrowly tailored limitation on its
operation. That is, the Full Deduction Rule is rejected for state and
local tax credits in excess of 15%, but it is retained for all other tax
benefits (i.e., federal and state deductions, as well as all state credits

102. For an alternative view, see Lawrence Zelenak, SALT Ceiling Workarounds and
Tax Shelters, TAX NOTES, July 23, 2018, at 521, 532–33.
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below 15%).103 The lack of precedent for such a change in the law is
noteworthy. In previous research on this topic, we have been unable to
identify a single instance where a taxpayer was required to reduce the
amount of her charitable contribution deduction by the value of the
tax benefits arising from making a charitable gift. What legal authority
there is on the subject—from the Tax Court, the 4th Circuit, the 10th
Circuit, and the IRS itself—supports the Full Deduction Rule.104 These
holdings generally ignore the tax effects of making a charitable
contribution in determining the amount of the federal deduction.
Significantly, this approach is also consistent with the federal income tax
treatment of nonrefundable tax credits in a variety of other settings.105
While the regulations mark a change of direction in the law, it is
likely that a federal court will have the final say on this matter.106 While
courts often (appropriately) defer to administrative interpretations of
a statute, that deference is not automatic and universal. To be sure, the
IRS is on firmer ground by having taken the approach of issuing
regulations via a notice-and-comment procedure rather than through
alternative subregulatory means.107 Nevertheless, given the sharp
departure from a century’s worth of law and practice, the validity of
these regulations is a proper subject of federal litigation.
Is there a valid justification for this departure from existing case law?
Some commentators have suggested that the introduction of the new
SALT cap constitutes a change in the law so significant that it warrants
a wholesale reconsideration of pre-TCJA case law. For example, Roger
Colinvaux has argued that the Full Deduction Rule should be
understood “against a legal baseline of deductible state tax payments”
and that TCJA “fundamentally changed the law by substantially

103. 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-1(h)(3)(vi).
104. See Bankman et al., supra note 83, at 641–42 (outlining the precedent and
policy supporting the Full Deduction Rule).
105. Alan L. Feld, Federal Taxation of State Tax Credits, TAX NOTES, May 30, 2016, at
1, 2 (noting that “both the IRS and the courts have excluded from income the receipt
of nonrefundable credits that reduce state income tax liability”).
106. Nick Niedzwiadek & Katherine Landergan, New Jersey, New York Sue to Challenge
IRS’ SALT Workaround Rule, POLITICO (July 17, 2019) https://www.politico.com/
states/new-york/albany/story/2019/07/17/new-jersey-new-york-sue-to-challenge-irssalt-workaround-rule-1107484 [https://perma.cc/2MV7-8VU3].
107. Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliot, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of
Federal Administrative Law 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1010 (1990).
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limiting the deductibility of state and local tax payments.”108 This is a
reasonable perspective; however, state and local taxes have been
nondeductible for AMT taxpayers since 1987, meaning that the Full
Deduction Rule has coexisted with nondeductible state and local taxes
for thirty-plus years. Moreover, federal income taxes have (almost)
always been nondeductible, and yet the amount of the taxpayer’s
charitable contribution deduction has always been the amount of cash
or fair market value of property donated, undiminished by the federal
tax savings derived from the gift.109 These considerations militate
against the view that TCJA ushered in a new legal baseline of
nondeductible taxes that would justify repudiating the Full Deduction
Rule for post-TCJA transfers.
Another question that some commentators have raised relates to the
application of the regulations to donations to organizations other than
state or local governments.110 The general argument is that the current
regulations relating to quid pro quo transfers apply only to benefits
received directly from the donee. Thus, benefits received from a third
party (in the case of tax benefits, the third party being the
government) do not implicate the quid pro quo regulations. By
applying the new rule to transfers involving any donee described in
section 170(c), not just government donees, the IRS has rejected this
argument. That is, the regulations treat the state and local tax benefits
derived from making a gift to the State of New York the same as the
state and local tax benefits from making a gift to, say, the United Way
or the Exceptional SC Fund discussed above.
This point, which I have emphasized in my own writing on the
subject, flows from a straightforward application of section 170(c),
which provides no basis for differentiating between gifts to
governments and other nonprofits.111 Moreover, as Roger Colinvaux
has emphasized in his writing on the subject, it is a well-settled
principle in this area of law that direct and indirect benefits arising
from the transfer are to be treated the same—or, as Colinvaux puts it,
“the relevant benefits do not have to come directly from the charity but
108. Roger Colinvaux, Failed Charity: Taking State Tax Benefits into Account for Purposes
of the Charitable Deduction, 66 BUFF. L. REV. 779, 816 (2018).
109. For a discussion of the history of the switch of the federal income tax from a
tax-exclusive to a tax-inclusive base, see LAWRENCE ZELENAK, FIGURING OUT THE TAX:
CONGRESS, TREASURY, AND THE DESIGN OF THE EARLY MODERN INCOME TAX 64–66 (2018).
110. Zelenak, supra note 79, at 375; Grewal, supra note 19, at 242–43.
111. See Bankman, supra note 83, at 644.
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rather flow from the transfer.”112 It is because of this legal principle
that the fates of the “red state” programs (tax credits for transfers to
private schools) and “blue state” programs (tax credits for transfers to
government funds) are linked. In each case, the donor is receiving the
identical thing—i.e., a state tax credit—the only difference is that in
one case, the qualifying donee is described in section 170(c)(1), and
in the other, it is described in section 170(c)(2).
B. Toward a Jurisprudence of “Constructive Taxation”?
One clear but unstated implication of the regulations is that a donor
who makes a charitable contribution where she receives or expects to
receive a state or local tax credit is making a de facto payment to the
extent of the tax savings derived from the outlay. Interestingly, in an
earlier Chief Counsel Advisory on this issue (where it was concluded
that state tax credits generally do not constitute a quid pro quo), it was
noted that “[t]here may be unusual circumstances in which it would
be appropriate to recharacterize a payment of cash or property that was, in
form, a charitable contribution as, in substance, a satisfaction of tax
liability.”113 While the regulations now treat state tax credits as a quid
pro quo, they do not take this final step of recharacterizing the payment
as “in substance, a satisfaction of tax liability.”114 Of course, the explicitly
stated reason for reducing the taxpayer’s charitable contribution
deduction is that the disallowed portion represents, in substance, the
satisfaction of a state or local tax liability. It would seem to follow from that
position that the disallowed portion represents a “constructive tax.”
In the notice-and-comment period for the proposed regulations, the
IRS received numerous comments drawing attention to this feature of
the regulations.115 Of particular concern were those situations involving
itemizing taxpayers with aggregate state and local tax liability under the
$10,000 cap. Some argued that these individuals would be treated unfairly
by the regulations in that they would neither be able to claim a charitable

112. Colinvaux, supra note 108, at 792.; see also Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104
(Example 11) (providing a hypothetical in which the amount of the charitable
contribution deduction was reduced by the value of a transitor radio transferred to
donor in exchange for a gift to charity, even though the transistor radio came from a
department store, not from the charity).
113. I.R.S., Office of Chief Counsel, Advisory 201105010 (Feb. 4, 2011), at 4
(emphasis added).
114. Id.
115. Contributions in Exchange for State or Local Tax Credits, 84 Fed. Reg. at 27,515.
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contribution deduction (because of the regulations) nor a state and local
tax deduction (because their tax liability had been reduced by the
credit).116 Treating a payment giving rise to a state tax credit as a
“constructive tax” would seem to be the natural solution.
The IRS may be reluctant to embrace this conclusion—and
understandably so. Characterizing a portion of an outlay made by
choice as a constructive tax would mark a significant departure from
current law and practice. For example, consider the IRS Notice issued
in late December 2017 regarding the “prepayment” of property
taxes.117 Since 2017 was the last year in which state and local taxes were
not capped at $10,000, many taxpayers hoped to bunch their property
taxes into 2017 by preparing some or all of their property taxes for
2018 or future years. In taking the position that such payments would
not be deductible as taxes, the IRS Notice observed that “[s]tate or
local law determines whether and when a property tax is assessed,
which is generally when the taxpayer becomes liable for the property
tax imposed.”118 Treating a donor’s payment as a constructive tax
would represent a departure from this position.
More fundamentally, the concept that the receipt of state or local
tax benefits should be treated as a constructive payment of the taxes
reduced has far broader potential implications well beyond the
domain of charitable contributions. If a contribution to a school
tuition organization that produces a state tax credit is treated as a de
facto satisfaction of tax liability, then the same logic would seem to
suggest that a payment of interest to one’s home mortgage lender
should also constitute a payment of tax to the extent that such payment
has the effect of reducing the payor’s tax liability. Countless other
situations involving the receipt of state or local tax benefits would likewise
seem to be implicated. For example, Minnesota provides a nonrefundable
state income tax credit for past military service.119 Massachusetts provides
a nonrefundable state income tax credit to certain individuals over age
sixty-five who have paid property taxes or rent.120 And of course,
numerous states offer tax credits for a wide range of activities, such as
historic preservation, environmental remediation, and economic
116. Id. at 27,519.
117. I.R.S. Advisory: Prepaid Real Property Taxes May Be Deductible in 2017 if
Assessed and Paid in 2017, IR-2017-210 (Dec. 27, 2017).
118. Id.
119. MINN. STAT. § 290.0677(1a) (2019).
120. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 62, § 6(k)(2) (2019).
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development.121 In each case, the federal income tax treatment of these
credits is premised upon the same basic legal principle that the regulations
have now repudiated in the context of state charitable tax credits.
In some ways, developing a set of rules for “constructive taxes” is
simply the next logical step after the regulations. Tax policy analysts
have long recognized that tax expenditures entail both a “constructive
tax” and a “constructive expenditure.” That is, to subsidize some
activity or payment via reduced taxes is the substantive equivalent of
collecting a tax and appropriating the resulting revenue. Perhaps the
most entertaining explanation of this tax expenditure concept is the
“weapons supply tax credit” (WSTC) described by the late David
Bradford in a wonderful essay on budgetary language.122 Bradford
proposed (tongue in cheek) to eliminate all federal spending on
weapons procurement and instead enact a new tax credit that weapons
manufacturers could claim upon delivery of statutorily specified
weapons systems to the Department of Defense. The result of these two
steps is that both government spending and tax receipts would decline
substantially—but of course, as Bradford explained, “the economic
reality would be unaffected.”123
If we take seriously this tax expenditure mode of analysis, the
implication would be that every time a taxpayer satisfies a portion of
her tax burden by making an outlay that qualifies for some tax
expenditure, a portion of that outlay “actually” (or “in reality” or “in
substance”) represents a payment of tax. In other words, the taxpayer
is, in effect, satisfying a portion of her tax burden by making a
qualifying expenditure.
C. The Paradox of Charitable Taxes and Non-Charitable Gifts
Although the Treasury regulations were finalized in June 2019,
ostensibly addressing the most pressing legal questions (pending the
litigation challenging the regulations referenced above), we are still
left with a perplexing irony regarding the new federal income tax
treatment of state and local taxes as compared to charitable
contributions. Two otherwise identical payments made to fund some
121. See, e.g., CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 24369.4 (West 2019) (environmental
remediation tax credit); IND. CODE § 6-3.1-13-14 (2019) (economic development tax
credit); VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-339.2 (2019) (historic preservation tax credit).
122. David F. Bradford, Reforming Budgetary Language, in PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC
POLICY IN THE NEW CENTURY 93 (Sijbren Cnossen & Hans-Verner Sinn eds., 2003).
123. Id. at 98.
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public good will be treated differently simply because one of them
takes the form of a charitable contribution, and the other is paid for
via taxation. For example, assume two taxpayers, A and B, both of
whom are subject to the top federal rate of 37% and both of whom
have already paid the maximum amount deductible state and local
taxes. Taxpayer A transfers $10,000 to a nonprofit organization to help
fund the operation of a local homeless shelter. Taxpayer B pays
$10,000 in taxes to her local government to help fund the operation
of a homeless shelter. We might assume that Taxpayer A resides in a
“red state” with relatively few government-provided services to address
homelessness, while Taxpayer B resides in a “blue state” with greater
tax-funded government spending on homelessness.
The effect of the SALT cap introduced by TCJA is that Taxpayer A
has 37% of the cost of her $10,000 outlay reimbursed to her by virtue
of the deduction available under section 170(a), while Taxpayer B
faces a $10,000 out-of-pocket cost. Thus, paradoxically, it is Taxpayer
B who is the more “charitable” of the two transferors—at least insofar
as we measure “charitable” by reference to degree of actual financial
sacrifice experienced by the transferor. Of course this is precisely the
intended result of the SALT cap—i.e., to treat all outlays taking the
form of a state or local tax payment as a type of personal consumption
and thus nondeductible in the same manner as the most self-indulgent
conspicuous consumption, such as a Reinast titanium toothbrush
($4200) or a Hang Fung golden toilet ($5 million).124
Whatever appeal this view may have in certain political quarters,
state and local tax payments have far more in common with charitable
contributions than with personal consumption, particularly for the
cohort of itemizing taxpayers who are most likely to be net contributors
to state and local public goods rather than net recipients. Thus, the
result of the SALT cap is the introduction of a new horizontal inequity
in the law, one that favors charitable outlays undertaken outside the
public sector as compared to those undertaken within the public
sector. In this sense, the SALT cap is similar in effect to various other
anti-government/anti-tax measures introduced in the United States
over the years, such as state constitutional limits on taxes (e.g.,
124. Hunter Atkins, The $4,000 Titanium Toothbrush, FORBES (Oct. 22, 2014, 11:46
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/hunteratkins/2014/10/22/the-4000-toothbrush
[https://perma.cc/G38C-N8MY]; Nat Berman, The Five Most Expensive Toilets in the
World, MONEY INC (June 24, 2018), https://moneyinc.com/the-five-most-expensivetoilets-in-the-world [https://perma.cc/YET8-2RHL].
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Proposition 13) or supermajority voter approval requirements to raise
taxes.125 While Congress no doubt has the prerogative to make such
changes, favoring non-tax transfers to homeless shelters over tax
transfers to the same shelters, future Congresses may wish to treat all
such transfers the same. The next Part considers those options.
IV. LEGISLATIVE OPTIONS FOR “SOCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS”
There are several legislative options available for Congress to
eliminate the discontinuity in the law described in this Article. First,
and most obviously, Congress could reinstate the deduction for state
and local taxes, reversing the limitations introduced via TCJA in
December 2017. This approach seems very unlikely, at least given the
current political composition of the legislative branches of
government. Among other things, simply repealing the SALT cap,
unless accompanied by offsetting revenue-increasing changes in the
law, would result in a significant decline of federal revenue.
Alternatively, Congress could repeal the deduction for charitable
contributions or impose a cap similar to the $10,000 SALT cap. Given
the broad political support for this provision, this option also seems
unlikely-though it too would restore neutrality as between state and
local taxes and charitable contributions.
An alternative legislative option—that would have the desired effect
of treating state and local taxes and charitable contributions the
same—would be to combine the tax treatment of the two types of
outlays into a single provision governing “social contributions.”
Congress could then subject the taxpayer’s total social contributions
for the year to a single uniform limitation, either applying a floor, a
ceiling, or some combination of those common statutory devices.
For example, consider a limitation of the sort advocated for more
general usage by Martin Feldstein and others.126 The idea of a Feldstein
cap is to allow itemized deductions but to limit the extent to which
those deductions, in combination, would reduce the taxpayer’s tax
liability. For example, a rule might specify that the taxpayer’s itemized
deductions can reduce her aggregate tax liability by no more than
125. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 2(a) (limiting property taxes and restricting
annual increases to an inflation factor not to exceed two percent per year); FLA. CONST. art.
VII, § 19 (requiring a supermajority to impose, authorize, or raise state taxes or fees).
126. Martin Feldstein et al., Capping Individual Tax Expenditure Benefits (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16,921), http://papers.nber.org/papers/
w16921 [https://perma.cc/CPH2-SHDB].
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some percentage of adjusted gross income, perhaps 5%. Thus, a
taxpayer with $500,000 of adjusted gross income (AGI) would be
allowed to claim capped deductions, but in combination, the
deductions could reduce her tax liability by no more than $25,000.
Assuming (for the sake of analysis) a marginal rate of 40%, this would
mean that deductions up to $62,500 would be allowed. Intriguingly,
while advocating for overall cap itemized deductions, Feldstein himself
took the position that there should be a special carve-out for charitable
contributions.127 In Feldstein’s view “[t]he full deduction for charitable
contributions should be retained, because the money that taxpayers give
to charity benefits those organizations rather than the individual taxpayer.”128
One might reasonably take issue with this assertion, but to whatever
extent Feldstein is correct in highlighting the benefits of charitable
outlays to donee organizations, the same logic applies in the case of
most state and local tax payments made by itemizing taxpayers. If a
carve-out for redistributive outlays is appropriate, that carve-out should
apply to all such payments, regardless of whether those payments take
the form of charitable gifts or state/local taxes. But of course providing
such a carve-out substantially dilutes the desired effect of the cap (to
broaden the tax base and limit deductions). Thus, if some version of
Feldstein’s cap were to be used, the better approach would be to apply
it uniformly to these similar types of outlays.
An alternative means of limiting deductions is to utilize a floor so
that the total outlay is deductible only to the extent that it exceeds
some specified threshold, perhaps based on a percentage of AGI, as is
done with medical expenses.129 As compared to statutory ceilings,
floors have the advantage of preserving the incentive at the margin, so
that any increase in the total amount of the outlay above the floor
increases the amount of the tax benefit. Put differently, utilizing a floor
enables policymakers to reduce the overall cost of the subsidy while
preserving the intended incentive effects. There are numerous design

127. Martin Feldstein, It’s Time to Cap Tax Deductions, WASH. POST (Mar. 12, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/its-time-to-cap-taxdeductions/2013/03/12/af05081c-8a63-11e2-8d72-dc76641cb8d4_story.html.
128. Id (emphasis added).
129. Hearing on Tax Reform Options: Incentives for Charitable Giving Before the Comm. on
Finance, 112th Cong. 10 (2011) (statement of C. Eugene Steuerle, Richard B. Fisher
Chair and Institute Fellow, Urban Institute); Deena Ackerman & Gerald Auten, Floors,
Ceilings, and Opening the Door for a Non-Itemizer Deduction, 59 NAT’L TAX J. 509 (2006); Roger
Colinvaux et al., The Charitable Deduction: Policy and Analysis, URBAN INST. 19 (2012).
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possibilities for such an approach, as well as many examples from
current and prior law. For our purposes, the essential feature is to
subject all social contributions—whether they take the form of a tax
payment of a charitable gift—to the same floor.
CONCLUSION: THE COGNATE NATURE OF TAXES AND GIFTS
A central question raised in this Article—and brought into focus by
the new SALT cap, as well as the ongoing controversy regarding the
federal tax treatment of state-level charitable tax credits—is how we
should view taxes and charitable contributions. Are these two radically
different things, warranting the differential tax treatment accorded by
the new law? Or is tax-funded government spending simply another
means of effectuating charitable investments? In his book, Who Really
Cares: The Surprising Truth about Compassionate Conservatism, Arthur
Brooks adopts an insistent tone on this point: “Let us be clear:
Government spending is not charity. It is not a voluntary sacrifice by
individuals. No matter how beneficial or humane it might be, no
matter how necessary it is for providing public services, it is still the
obligatory redistribution of tax revenues.”130
If the post-TCJA debate over state charitable tax credits reveals
nothing else, it is that rigid distinctions like this—between “voluntary
sacrifice” of charitable giving on the one hand and “obligatory
redistribution” of taxation on the other—simply do not hold up under
scrutiny. Of course, it is always possible to posit extreme examples to
score partisan points. Those who are ideologically committed to
portraying “taxation” as coercive exactions bearing no resemblance to
charitable giving might point to taxes we must all pay to fund
legislators’ salaries and compare those to voluntary gifts that some
family makes to a local soup kitchen. Juxtaposing these extreme
examples serves the political function of portraying taxes as feeding
leviathan and gifts as high-minded acts of voluntary sacrifice. But it is
just as easy to posit two alternative examples making the opposite
point. Is a “gift” to the exclusive private school that one’s children
attend really all that charitable? How does that payment compare to
the property taxes paid to support public schools in a poor
neighborhood attended by underprivileged children? In many cases,

130. ARTHUR C. BROOKS, WHO REALLY CARES?: THE SURPRISING TRUTH ABOUT
COMPASSIONATE CONSERVATISM, AMERICA’S CHARITY DIVIDE—WHO GIVES, WHO DOESN’T,
AND WHY IT MATTERS 20 (2006).
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perhaps even more often than not, government services funded by
taxation will promote charitable purposes more effectively (and
extensively) than private philanthropy ever can. The fact that
individuals operationalize their charitable giving through the
collective mechanism of taxation and government does not diminish
its fundamentally charitable character.
If one were looking for a counterpoint to Brooks’s paean to private
philanthropy, a good candidate might be the statement, commonly
attributed to Barney Frank, that “government is simply the name we
give to the things we choose to do together.”131 But this perspective also
seems incomplete, for surely there are many “things we choose to do
together” that fall outside the ambit of “government”—most notably,
those investments we make through the non-governmental charitable
sector.132 Whether the vehicle is Habitat for Humanity, the American Red
Cross, or perhaps a local soup kitchen organized at one’s church,
synagogue, or mosque, the “things we do together” go well beyond the
activities of government.
Ultimately, we need a conception of “charitable” transfers that is
ecumenical enough to encompass the views expressed in both the
Brooks and Frank statements. We may or may not want to use the federal
tax system to promote charitable investments, but if we do, we should
recognize that there are alternative methods of pooling resources and
craft an approach that accommodates a diversity of approaches.

131. Ross Douthat, Government and Its Rivals, N.Y. TIMES SR12 (Jan. 29, 2012).
132. Id.

